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ABSTRACT 
 
Changes in the statutory corporate income tax rate provide firms with an opportunity to reduce 
their tax burden by shifting their taxable income from higher to lower tax rate years. One negative 
consequence of shifting taxable income across years is higher variation in book income for 
financial reporting purposes. Taxable income and book income are closely related in most 
countries, and, in general, reporting volatile book income across years is not a favorable signal to 
investors. This study investigates how firms shift taxable income and concurrently mitigate book 
income fluctuation by managing accrual components separately when the statutory income tax 
rate changes. Unlike prior studies, we decompose discretionary accruals into two components and 
examine distinctive patterns of accrual management in Korea, where book-tax conformity is high 
and aggressive tax avoidance is restricted. We find that firms manage book-tax accruals for 
taxable income shifting and manage book-only accruals to mitigate book income fluctuation. 
Furthermore, we find the extent of book-tax and book-only accruals management varies 
depending on the firms’ tax and financial reporting costs. The results of this study provide clear 
and compelling evidence of firms’ opportunistic accrual management behavior in response to 
statutory tax rate reduction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 change in statutory corporate income tax rates creates a unique situation in which a firm’s tax 
decisions may take priority over financial accounting decisions.
1
 Firms can substantially reduce their 
tax burden by shifting taxable income from the higher to the lower tax rate period (Sholes et al., 
1992). Prior studies have examined firms’ tax-motivated behaviors in periods of statutory tax rate reductions, as the 
tax-saving benefits in such years are expected to be far greater than those in other years.
2
 Guenther (1994) and 
Lopez et al. (1998) report that firms decrease accruals and, in consequence, income in anticipation of a tax rate 
reduction, deferring taxable income to later (less tax onerous) years. They also argue that the decrease in accruals is 
insignificant when the financial reporting cost is higher than the tax-saving benefits, as managers still weigh book 
income when the tax rate reduction is anticipated. 
 
This study investigates the strategic accrual management behavior that firms exhibit as they attempt to 
resolve the trade-off between taxable and book income in response to statutory tax rate reductions. Our approach is 
                                           
1 When corporate managers make accounting decisions, they encounter a trade-off between taxable and book income; tax 
minimization strategies often lead to lower book income. Managers of publicly listed firms normally give priority to book income 
for financial reporting purposes, given their concern for its impact on the firm’s cost of capital in the capital market and 
managerial compensation (Cloyd et al., 1996). 
2 In particular, they pay attention to accrual management rather than real expenditure management, as the latter is more costly to 
manage. 
A 
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different from prior studies in that we decompose accruals into two components and examine how these components 
are managed differently in a setting where accruals are the primary tools for taxable income shifting and book-tax 
conformity is high. 
 
Accruals, used primarily for financial reporting purposes, can be decomposed into book-tax accruals and 
book-only accruals depending on whether they affect taxable income (Calegari 2000). Typical book-tax accruals 
include revenues and expenses that are recognized in the same period for both tax and financial reports. On the other 
hand, typical book-only accruals include estimation accounts, such as allowance or depreciation accounts, which are 
recognized differently in tax and financial reports. Changes in book-only accruals do not affect the taxable income 
because tax deduction limits on allowance or depreciation accounts are predetermined by tax law-based formulas. 
 
Hence, firms are expected to manage book-tax accruals to shift their taxable income to the year of a tax rate 
reduction. For example, they may choose to defer recognition of revenues or accelerate recognition of expenses in 
the year prior to the tax rate reduction. However, deferral of revenues or acceleration of expenses inevitably involves 
fluctuation in book income; book income is decreased in the year prior to the tax rate reduction and increased in the 
year of the tax rate reduction. In such cases, book-only accruals can be effective tools to mitigate book income 
fluctuation without foregoing the tax-saving benefits. For example, an understatement of the allowance in the year 
prior to the tax rate reduction can raise book income without affecting taxable income, compensating for the 
decrease in book income caused by book-tax accrual management. In the year of the tax rate reduction, the 
allowance may be overstated to the same extent that it was understated in the preceding year; book income then 
decreases accordingly, resulting in a steady book income stream across years without affecting taxable income. Thus, 
firms can save taxes and mitigate book income volatility by managing book-tax and book-only accruals in opposite 
directions. 
 
We test our hypotheses by analyzing recent archival data on publicly listed Korean firms. In Korea, 
corporate tax rates were reduced three times during the 2000s; the maximum statutory tax rate was reduced in 2002 
(1%), 2005 (2%), and 2009 (3%), dropping from 28% to 22% over this time period. Korean firms are more likely to 
depend on accruals for tax planning than are U.S. firms, which have more opportunities to utilize aggressive tax 
shelters. Moreover, as the book-tax conformity in Korea is higher, the conflict between book and taxable income is 
higher than in the U.S. (Choi et al., 2009). Therefore, we expect Korea to provide a powerful research setting in 
which to examine the effective accrual management behavior that firms exhibit in resolving book tax trade-offs. 
 
Our empirical findings show that book-tax accruals increase and book-only accruals decrease in the year of 
a tax rate reduction. The increase in book-tax accruals supports the notion that firms shift taxable income from the 
year before to the year of the tax rate reduction by deferring revenue or accelerating expenses. On the other hand, 
the decrease in book-only accruals indicates that firms mitigate book income fluctuation during the period of the tax 
rate reduction by adjusting estimation accounts. We further find that the increase in book-tax accruals is more 
pronounced for firms with a higher marginal tax rate, while the decrease in book-only accruals is salient for firms 
with a higher debt ratio. This finding implies that the management of book-tax and book-only accruals varies 
according to firms’ tax and financial reporting costs. 
 
The results of this study contribute to the extant literature in at least three ways. First, we find that firms 
distinguish tax and financial reporting decisions in response to tax rate reductions; prior studies mainly focus on tax-
motivated decisions. Second, our empirical findings from the use of accrual components suggest that traditional 
accrual measures-such as the Jones model of discretionary accruals (1991) for book income management or Desai 
and Dharmapala’s residual (2006) for tax avoidance-can be improved by disaggregating accruals into detailed 
categories and applying different components for different purposes. Third, compared with earlier studies, our 
findings-based on data from Korean firms-provide clearer and more compelling evidence of firms’ accrual 
management behavior in resolving the book tax trade-offs. Section 2 contains a more detailed explanation regarding 
the contributions of this study. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops 
the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample, variables, and research methods. Section 4 presents the 
results, while Section 5 concludes the study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Literature Review 
 
Research on Corporate Tax Rate Changes 
 
Scholes et al. (1992) investigate whether firms shift income across time periods in response to the United 
States Tax Reform Act of 1986 (hereafter “TRA 86”), which reduced the corporate tax rate from a maximum of 46% 
to 34% over a period of two years. They find that firms shift some portion of their gross margin from the preceding 
quarters to the quarters of the scheduled tax rate reduction; however, they do not find evidence that firms have 
accelerated selling, general, or administrative expenses. The authors also discuss cross-sectional differences in firms’ 
propensities to shift income, providing evidence that smaller firms are less engaged in income shifting in 
anticipation of the tax rate reduction. 
 
Guenther (1994) focuses on current discretionary accruals that are expected to affect taxable income; he 
estimates current discretionary accruals by subtracting the change in current liabilities from the change in current 
assets. According to his estimation method, however, allowance accounts are incorrectly included in the accruals 
that affect taxable income. He finds that firms have reduced discretionary accruals in the year prior to the passage of 
TRA 86. He further examines whether the level of these income-decreasing accruals varies depending on a firm’s 
fiscal year-end date, size, level of debt, and level of manager ownership. The results showed that discretionary 
accruals in the year preceding the tax rate reduction were negatively related to firm size and positively related to 
debt levels; this implies that income deferral is expected in only those firms for which tax savings are higher than 
nontax costs. He does not find an association between a firm’s fiscal year-end or level of manager ownership and the 
level of income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
 
Lopez et al. (1998) utilize the tax subsidy measure developed by Wilkie (1992) as a proxy for firm-level tax 
aggressiveness, predicting that more aggressive tax planning firms will have a higher probability of making negative 
accrual shifts in the year before the TRA 86 tax rate reduction. In addition, they expect to find that more aggressive 
tax planning firms have made greater negative accrual shifts in the year preceding the tax rate reduction compared 
with other firms. The results support their expectations; the variable for tax aggressive behavior is significantly 
correlated with discretionary accruals. 
 
In Korea, several corporate tax rate reductions occurred in the 1990s. The tax rate was slashed 2 percentage 
points in 1994, 1995, and 1996; the original tax rate of 34% fell to 28%. Shin (2002) and Kim and Park (2003) 
examine whether Korean firms have decreased their discretionary accruals to defer income in the years prior to these 
tax rate reductions, but their results are not consistent; while Kim and Park (2003) find evidence of tax-motivated 
management of discretionary accruals in the years prior to the tax rate reductions, Shin (2002) does not. Shin (2002) 
argues that, as the tax rate reductions are relatively small compared with those in the U.S., firms do not have as 
much incentive to manage discretionary accruals. 
 
In sum, previous studies have regarded discretionary accruals as a means to manage taxable income for tax 
planning when tax decisions take priority over financial accounting decisions. However, a large body of literatures 
has documented discretionary accruals primarily as a means to manage book income for financial reporting purposes. 
Although accruals can be used to manage book and taxable income, very few studies, with the exception of Calegari 
(2000), have explored the simultaneous management of accruals. 
 
Calegari (2000) recognizes that accruals can be divided into two different types depending on whether they 
affect taxable income. He defines accruals with high book-tax conformity as “book-tax accruals,” and finds that 
firms with increased marginal tax rates due to TRA 86 have adjusted their book-tax accruals downward for tax 
planning. In addition, he defines accruals with low book-tax conformity as “book-only accruals,” and reports that 
firms had simultaneously adjusted book-only accruals upward to accomplish financial reporting objectives. However, 
his analysis are limited to long-term construction firms based on the assumption that TRA 86 has eliminated the tax 
deferral benefit for those firms by replacing the completed-contract method with the percentage-of-completion 
method. 
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Contributions to Extant Literature 
 
This study makes the following contributions to the extant literature. First, we investigate how firms 
minimize not only tax, but also financial reporting costs, in response to a tax rate reduction. In contrast to prior 
studies that mainly focus on tax-motivated income shifting behavior, we concurrently examine firms’ utilization of 
an explicit measure that does not impede tax-motivated income shifting to reduce financial reporting costs. 
 
Second, this study aims to explain how different components of accruals can be used simultaneously for 
different purposes and emphasizes the importance of decomposing accruals into two different measures, tax 
planning and book income management. Previous studies have used aggregate accruals, such as Jones’ model of 
discretionary accruals (1991) or Desai and Dharmapala’s tax avoidance measure (2006), to examine firms’ book 
income management or tax planning. However, the Jones model of discretionary accruals (1991) does not control 
for accrual management of tax planning, which may result in an overly inclusive estimate for book income 
management. Desai and Dharmapala’s tax avoidance measure (2006) may result in an estimate with a similar 
problem, as the measure is estimated by a residual of book-tax difference that is not captured by total accruals. 
 
Finally, our analysis is performed in a unique setting (Korea) where book-tax conformity is high and 
accruals are the primary tools for tax planning. Accrual management for tax planning purposes has a more 
significant effect on book income for Korean firms due to their higher book-tax conformity. Moreover, in Korea, 
aggressive tax shelters such as tax havens or transfer pricing are utilized to a very limited extent, whereas in the U.S., 
there are many opportunities for multinational firms to use aggressive tax shelters. Thus, our findings provide more 
compelling evidence of firms’ opportunistic accrual management behavior in dealing with a higher degree of book 
tax trade-offs. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Changes in corporate tax rates provide strong incentives for firms to shift taxable income to the period of 
the tax rate reduction for tax minimization. Therefore, in a country where accruals are the primary tools of tax 
planning, firms are expected to defer taxable income to the year of the tax rate reduction by using accruals that affect 
taxable income; we classify them as book-tax accruals. For example, they can defer revenue accruals or accelerate 
expense accruals in the year preceding the tax rate reduction. Such deferral of revenues or acceleration of expenses 
is generally reversed in the following year, resulting in an increase in revenues or a decrease in expenses. Therefore, 
we expect book-tax accruals to increase in the year of a tax rate reduction if firms shift taxable income by managing 
book-tax accruals to avoid taxes. 
 
Hypothesis 1-1: Book-tax accruals will increase in the year of a tax rate reduction. 
 
Firms engaged in book-tax accrual management in response to a tax rate reduction typically trade off tax 
savings with financial reporting costs because the deferral of revenues or acceleration of expenses also lowers book 
income in the year prior to the tax rate reduction. Therefore, firms with concerns about the level of book income are 
expected to manage accruals that do not affect taxable income; we classify them as book-only accruals. For example, 
firms understate their allowance for bad debts to increase their book income in the year prior to a tax rate reduction. 
Conversely, in the following year, they overstate their allowance for bad debts to the same extent that the account 
was understated in the preceding year, and the book income decreases accordingly. By managing book-only accruals 
and book-tax accruals in opposite directions, firms can alleviate the fluctuation in book income without foregoing 
tax-saving benefits. Thus, we expect book-only accruals to decrease in the year of a tax rate reduction. 
 
Hypothesis 1-2: Book-only accruals will decrease in the year of a tax rate reduction. 
 
Whether firms put more emphasis on the benefits of tax saving or on the consequence of financial reporting 
depends on firm characteristics. It is indisputable that firms with high tax costs have more incentives for effective 
tax planning than do firms with lower tax costs. Manzon’s marginal tax rate (1994) is a measure that assesses a 
firm’s tax costs by estimating the present value of $1 of tax payable on additional income. Thus, we expect that 
firms with higher marginal tax rates in previous years are more likely to exploit the opportunity to reduce corporate 
taxes by managing book-tax accruals. 
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On the other hand, financial reporting costs also affect firms’ accounting decisions. This is because 
reporting lower book income may result in a decrease in a manager’s compensation, increased interest rates on debt 
holdings, forced repayment of debt, or undervaluation of stock prices. In this study, we mainly focus on the financial 
reporting costs associated with violating debt covenants. The closer a firm is to violating accounting-based debt 
covenants, the more likely it is that the firm will make income-increasing accounting choices (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). This implies that firms with a high debt ratio have higher financial reporting costs and, thus, are 
likely to manage book income upward. According to our first hypothesis, book income, which is lowered by the 
management of book-tax accruals in the year prior to the tax rate reduction, can be increased by the management of 
book-only accruals. Therefore, we expect that firms with higher financial reporting costs, using debt ratios as a 
proxy, are more likely to increase book income by managing book-only accruals in response to the tax rate reduction. 
In this case, the reversal effect of book-only accruals is expected to be greater in the year of the tax rate reduction. 
 
In sum, given that firms’ incentives for managing accrual components differ according to their tax and 
financial reporting costs, firms should exhibit different levels of increase in book-tax accruals and decrease in book-
only accruals in the year of the tax rate reduction. 
 
Hypothesis 2-1: The increase in book-tax accruals in the year of a tax rate reduction will be greater for firms with 
high tax costs. 
 
Hypothesis 2-2: The decrease in book-only accruals in the year of a tax rate reduction will be greater for firms with 
high financial reporting costs. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Designing Research Model 
 
Measuring Book-Tax Accruals and Book-Only Accruals 
 
We adopt the procedure of Calegari (2000) to calculate book-tax and book-only accruals by decomposing 
total accruals into two components. Consistent with previous studies (Jones, 1991; Sloan, 1996; Bradshaw et al., 
2001), total accruals for firm i in year t are calculated as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
TAi,t = Total accruals 
△CAi,t = Changes in current assets  
△Cashi,t = Changes in cash and cash equivalent 
△CLi,t = Changes in current liabilities 
△STDi,t = Changes in long-term current liabilities 
Depi,t = Depreciation expenses for tangible and intangible assets 
(All variables above are deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year) 
 
Total accruals (TA) are decomposed into total book-tax accruals and total book-only accruals. Allowance 
for bad debts, allowance for inventory valuation loss, depreciation, and amortization expenses are classified as book-
only accruals (BOA), as they are treated differently by tax laws and financial reporting requirements. Tax-related 
accounts such as current deferred tax asset/liability and tax receivable/payable are also classified as book-only 
accruals (BOA) because they cannot be tools for managing taxable income. Book-tax accruals (BTA) are estimated 
by subtracting book-only accruals (BOA) from total accruals. 
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BTAi,t = Total book-tax accruals 
BOAi,t = Total book-only accruals 
△DTAi,t = Changes in current deferred tax assets  
△DTLi,t = Changes in current deferred tax liabilities 
△TaxReci,t = Changes in income tax receivables 
△TaxPayi,t = Changes in income tax payable  
△ALLOWi,t = Changes in allowances for bad debts and inventory valuation  
(All of the above variables are deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year) 
 
Following Calegari (2000), we use the Rees et al. (1996) model, which modified the Jones model (1991) to 
disentangle the discretionary portion of book-tax accruals (BTA) and book-only accruals (BOA).
3
 Discretionary 
book-tax accruals (DBTA) (hereafter, “book-tax accruals”) and discretionary book-only accruals (DBOA) (hereafter, 
“book-only accruals”) are determined as follows4: 
 
                      
 
          
       
          
          
       
      
          
                                                                  
 
                      
 
          
       
          
          
      
      
          
       
      
          
                             
 
DBTAi,t = Discretionary book-tax accruals 
DBOAi,t = Discretionary book-only accruals 
△ADJREVi,t = Changes in revenues minus change in receivables 
CFOi,t = Cash flow from operations  
PPEi,t = Tangible and intangible assets subject to depreciation  
ASSETi,t-1 = Total assets at the beginning of the year 
△ALLOWi,t = Changes in allowances for bad debts and inventory valuation  
 
The change in book-tax accruals (△DBTA) and book-only accruals (△DBOA) for firm i in year t are 
estimated by subtracting the values of year t-1 from the respective values of year t. In this study, the change 
variables of book-tax accruals (△DBTA) and book-only accruals (△DBOA) are used to investigate whether they are 
increased or decreased in the year of a tax rate reduction compared with the year prior to the tax rate reduction. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Research Model 
 
To verify the firms’ taxable income shifting through book-tax accruals, we regress changes in book-tax 
accruals (△DBTA) on the year dummy (YR), which equals “1” if the firm-year is the year of a tax rate reduction and 
“0” otherwise. We also regress changes in book-only accruals (△DBOA) on the year dummy (YR) to investigate the 
firms’ management of book-only accruals to mitigate book income fluctuation. 
 
 
 
                                           
3 We exclude industries with less than 10 sample firms because book-tax and book-only accruals are estimated for each industry 
and each year using the cross-sectional modified Jones model. 
4 Given that book-tax and book-only accruals are estimated by adopting the modified Jones model, the variables can be 
susceptible to criticism regarding the ability of the model to isolate discretion. 
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YRi,t = Dummy variable that equals “1” if the year is 2005 or 2009 and “0” otherwise 
SIZEi,t = Natural logarithm of total assets 
△SIZEi,t = Change in firm size 
LEVi,t = Total debt divided by total equity 
△LEVi,t = Change in LEV  
ROAi,t = Net income divided by lagged total assets  
△ROAi,t = Change in ROA 
CFOi,t = Cash flow from operations divided by lagged total asset 
△CFOi,t = Change in CFO 
 
MTRi,t  = Manzon’s marginal tax rate (1994) modified for Korean tax laws.  
  
                            
     
  
where tr is the maximum statutory tax rate; r is an annual average interest rate on 3-year 
corporate bonds; n= NOLsi,t-1/EFAIi,t-1 
  
where NOLs is net operating loss at period t-1, EFAI is market value of equity multiplied by r at  
  
period t-1 
  
If n is higher than 5, n is assumed equal to 5 because Korean tax laws allow firms to carry over 
NOLs for 5 years. For firms with no NOLs, MTR is assumed to equal 1 Korean Won multiplied 
by the maximum statutory rate. 
△MTRi,t = Change in MTR 
PBRi,t = Market value divided by total equity  
△PBRi,t = Change in PBR 
LOSSi,t = Dummy variable that equals “1” if net income is negative and “0” otherwise 
 
Control variables that are expected to affect the change in book-tax accruals (△DBTA) and the change in 
book-tax accruals (△DBOA) include firm size (SIZE), debt ratio (LEV), cash flow from operations (CFO), 
profitability (ROA), marginal tax rate (MTR), market-to-book ratio (PBR), and loss (LOSS). 
 
We expect that the coefficient of YR, β1 in model (8) will be positive if book-tax accruals are increased in 
the year of a tax rate reduction, as mentioned in hypothesis 1-1. On the other hand, we expect a negative value for 
the coefficient of YR, β1 in model (9) if book-only accruals are decreased in the year of a tax rate reduction, as in 
hypothesis 1-2. 
 
In addition, because we assume that incentives for managing book-tax accruals differ depending on the 
firm’s tax cost, we partition sample firms into two groups based on the firm’s marginal tax rates (MTR). If firm i's 
marginal tax rate (MTR) is higher than the industrial mean in the same year, the firm is included in the high tax cost 
group. If firm i's MTR is lower than the industrial mean in the same year, the firm is included in the low tax cost 
group. By estimating the regression model (8) for each group, we test 2-1 hypothesis and expect that β1 will have a 
greater positive value for the high tax cost group than the value for the low tax cost group. 
 
On the other hand, incentives for managing book-only accruals are expected to differ depending on firms’ 
financial reporting costs, which are assessed by the firm’s debt ratios. Thus, if firm i's debt ratio is higher than the 
industrial median in the same year, the firm is included in the high financial cost group. The remaining firms are 
classified as the low financial cost group. By estimating the regression model (9) for each group, we test our 2-2 
hypothesis and anticipate that β1 will have a greater negative value for the high financial reporting cost group than 
the value for the low financial reporting cost group. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2013 Volume 29, Number 5 
1428 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
Sample Selection 
 
Our initial sample consists of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) during the period between 
2003 and 2009. We exclude the 1% tax reduction of 2002 from our analysis because it is deemed too small to 
provide firms with incentives for tax-saving benefits. Financial firms are excluded from the sample because of the 
unique nature of their financial data. Non-December year-end firms are also eliminated from the sample for 
homogeneity. The financial and stock data are gathered from the TS2000 (http://www.kokoinfo.com) and KIS-
VALUE (http://www.kisline.com) databases.
5
 These procedures resulted in the final sample comprising 3,539 firm-
years, as reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Sample Descriptions 
Panel A. Sample Selection Procedure 
Sample Selection  Firm-years  
All firm-year observations from the database without missing values from 2003 to 2009  4,209  
(Less) Financial firms  (324)  
(Less) Non-December year-end firms  (269)  
(Less) Firms in industries with less than  (77)  
Final sample size  3,539  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used to analyze changes in book-tax accruals and 
book-only accruals in the year of a tax rate reduction. The change in book-tax accruals (  DBTA) and book-only 
accruals (  DBOA) show symmetrical distributions. The range for book-tax accruals (  DBTA) is wider than the 
range for book-only accruals (  DBOA) because book-only accruals are limited to estimation accounts such as 
allowances, depreciation, and amortization. These statistics suggest that there are many opportunities for 
corporations to use book-tax accruals to achieve their tax planning goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
5 TS2000 and KIS-VALUE databases systems are Korean equivalents of COMPUSTAT or CRSP in the U.S, providing financial 
and stock price data for firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange.  
Panel B. Samples by Year and Industries 
Year  Firm-years  Industry  Firm-years  
2003  455  Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Products  208  
2004  472  Fiber Products and Wearing apparel  168  
2005  490  Wood and Pulp Products  135  
2006  506  Chemical Products, Medical chemicals  673  
2007  521  Non-metallic Mineral Products  144  
2008  542  Metal Products  303  
2009  553  Automobiles and Auto parts, and 
Transportation Manufacturing 
 781  
  3,539  Construction  306  
    Wholesale Trade  252  
    Other Service Activities  569  
      3,539  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables (N=3,539) 
 
Variables Mean SD Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
  DBTA -0.0041 0.1581 -0.5463 -0.0822 -0.0009 0.0754 0.5050 
  DBOA -0.0001 0.0447 -0.1655 -0.0182 -0.0012 0.0169 0.1778 
YR 0.2947 0.4560 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
SIZE 19.5386 1.5040 16.8541 18.4520 19.2396 20.4257 23.7283 
  SIZE 0.0708 0.1832 -0.6196 -0.0133 0.0613 0.1432 0.7443 
LEV 0.4481 0.1926 0.0770 0.3027 0.4555 0.5908 0.8933 
  LEV -0.0064 0.0779 -0.3038 -0.0395 -0.0060 0.0281 0.2401 
ROA 0.0352 0.0874 -0.3822 0.0099 0.0402 0.0780 0.2433 
  ROA -0.0022 0.0858 -0.3501 -0.0300 -0.0017 0.0252 0.3128 
CFO 0.0494 0.0853 -0.2257 0.0035 0.0500 0.0965 0.3011 
  CFO -0.0025 0.0956 -0.2971 -0.0505 -0.0044 0.0450 0.3090 
MTR 0.2708 0.0224 0.1959 0.2748 0.2750 0.2750 0.2970 
  MTR -0.0072 0.0193 -0.0690 -0.0220 0.0000 0.0000 0.0666 
PBR 1.0518 0.9832 0.1422 0.4525 0.7301 1.2596 6.0078 
  PBR 0.0320 0.7969 -3.5723 -0.1891 0.0366 0.2535 3.3829 
LOSS 0.0930 0.2904 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes:   DBTA is change in discretionary book-tax accruals from model (6),   DBOA is change in discretionary book-only 
accruals from model (7), YR is dummy variable that equals “1” if the year is 2005 or 2009 and “0” otherwise, SIZE is natural 
logarithm of total assets,   SIZE is change in firm size, LEV is total debt divided by total equity,   LEV is change in LEV, ROA 
is net income divided by lagged total assets,   ROA is change in ROA, CFO is cash flow from operations divided by lagged total 
assets,   CFO is change in CFO, MTR is Manzon’s marginal tax rate (1994) modified for Korean tax laws,   MTR is change in 
MTR, PBR is market value divided by total equity,   PBR is change in PBR, and LOSS is dummy variable that equals “1” if net 
income is negative and “0” otherwise. 
 
Regression Results 
 
Column A of Table 3 provides the regression results for the association between tax rate reductions and the 
change in book-tax accruals. The statistically significant and positive coefficient for YR confirms that book-tax 
accruals shift from the year preceeding the year of a tax rate reduction, known as taxable income shifting. Column B 
in Table 3 reports the regression results for the association between tax rate reductions and the change in book-only 
accruals. The result shows that the change in book-only accruals ( DBOA) is negatively associated with YR, 
suggesting that book-only accruals are decreased in the year of a tax rate reduction because they are managed to 
mitigate book income fluctuation. 
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Table 3 Regression Results for the Entire Firm Sample 
                                                                              
                                               
  
                                                      
                                               
   
                                                       
Coefficients 
Dependent Variable 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
  DBTA   DBOA   DA   DESAI 
(t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) 
Intercept -0.1696 0.0333 -0.0927 -0.0101  
 
(-3.1)** (2.05)** (-1.81)* (-0.34) 
YR 0.0323 -0.0042 0.0118 0.0110  
 
(3.96)*** (-1.73)* (1.55) (2.49)** 
SIZE 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0001  
 
(0.32) (-0.41) (0.38) (0.17) 
  SIZE 0.0068 0.0065 0.0231 0.0084  
 
0.44 (1.41) (1.59) (1.00) 
LEV 0.0246 0.0027 0.0219 -0.0159  
 
(1.65)* (0.63) (1.57) (-1.97)** 
  LEV -0.2677 -0.0575 -0.3228 -0.0248  
 
(-7.21)*** (1.41) (-9.29)*** (-1.24) 
ROA -0.0792 0.0122 -0.1218 0.0393  
 
(-1.71)* (0.89) (-2.81)*** (1.57) 
  ROA 0.4923 -0.0411 0.4740 0.6928  
 
(12.86)*** (-3.62)** (13.24)*** (33.39)*** 
CFO -0.0375 0.0163 -0.0078 -0.0772  
 
(-0.84) (1.24) (-0.19) (-3.19)*** 
  CFO -0.2679 -0.0254 -0.2914 0.0989  
 
(-7.74)*** (-2.48)** (-9.00)*** (5.27)*** 
MTR 0.5021 -0.1176 0.2321 0.0444 
 
(3.15)** (-2.49)** (1.56) (0.51) 
  MTR -0.0597 -0.0803 -0.1864 -0.2557 
 
(-0.3) (-1.37) (-1.01) (-2.40)** 
PBR -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0009  
 
(-0.28) (-0.34) (-0.06) (-0.56) 
  PBR -0.0077 0.0038 -0.0021 -0.0039 
 
(-2.08)** (3.51)*** (-0.63) (-1.95)* 
LOSS 0.0099 0.0004 0.0115 -0.0018  
 
(1.02) (0.14) (1.26) (-0.34) 
F-Value 31.48*** 4.58*** 35.96*** 160.92*** 
R2-Adj 0.1076 0.0139 0.1215 0.3876 
N 3539 3539 3539 3539 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
  DA is discretionary accruals from modified Jones (1991) models,   DEASI is tax avoidance from Desai's (2006) tax 
avoidance measure, and all other variable are defined in Table 2.  
 
In addition, we replace the change in book-tax accruals (  DBTA) and the change in book-only accruals (  
DBOA) in the regression model with the change in discretionary accruals (  DA) as a dependent variable to analyze 
the effect of decomposing book-tax accruals and book-only accruals. The result, in Column C, shows that the 
coefficient for YR is positive but insignificant, which indicates that corporations use book-tax accruals and book-
only accruals inversely and that the analysis without deposed accrual components may not yield a significant result. 
 
Further, we run a regression using Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) measure of tax avoidance (  DESAI) as 
a dependent variable to analyze the change in the level of tax avoidance in the year preceding and the year of a tax 
rate reduction. It is expected that the level of tax avoidance is decreased in the year of the tax rate reduction because 
the tax rate is lower than in the year preceding the reduction. Column D of Table 3 shows that the level of tax 
avoidance is increased in the year of the tax rate reduction, contrary to our expectation. We presume that the result is 
due to the limitation of Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) tax avoidance measure, which does not take into account tax 
avoiding activities via book-tax accruals. 
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Table 4 Regression Results for Sample Firms Divided by Firm Characteristics 
Panel A. Analysis of Sample Firms Divided by MTR in Year t-2 
                                                                             
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                    
Variables 
High Tax Cost Group (A) Low Tax Cost Group (B) 
Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. 
Intercept -0.0528 -0.78 -0.2717 -1.94** 
YR 0.0346 3.62*** 0.0244 1.1 
SIZE 0.0005 0.31 -0.0021 -0.35 
  SIZE 0.0132 0.75 0.0196 0.49 
LEV 0.0209 1.31 0.0225 0.46 
  LEV -0.3078 -7.39*** -0.1869 -1.94** 
ROA -0.1311 -2.46** -0.0351 -0.32 
  ROA 0.6068 13.53*** 0.3159 3.72*** 
CFO -0.0368 -0.77 -0.0353 -0.28 
  CFO -0.2643 -7.08*** -0.3308 -3.57*** 
MTR 0.0979 0.48 1.1068 2.84*** 
  MTR 0.3689  1.27 -0.4282 -1.12 
PBR -0.0003 -0.1 0.0012 0.15 
  PBR -0.0038 -0.94 -0.0178 -1.9** 
LOSS 0.0090 0.88 0.0168 0.6 
F-Value 31.58*** 4.29*** 
R2-Adj 0.1246 0.1246 
N 3008 531 
Panel B. Analysis of Sample Firms Divided by LEV in Year t-1 
                                                                             
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                    
Variables 
High Financial Reporting Cost Group (A) Low Financial Reporting Cost Group (B) 
Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. 
Intercept 0.0304 1.32 0.0240 0.95 
YR -0.0056 -1.69* -0.0002 -0.05 
SIZE -0.0002 -0.34 -0.0003 -0.38 
  SIZE 0.0030 0.50 0.0208 2.84** 
LEV 0.0102 1.00 -0.0111 -1.32 
  LEV 0.0102 -2.57** -0.0659 -3.67*** 
ROA 0.0079 0.41 0.0172 0.87 
  ROA 0.0129 0.81 -0.1223 -7.48*** 
CFO 0.0392 2.09** -0.0160 -0.84 
  CFO -0.0333 -2.35** -0.0103 -0.69 
MTR -0.1217 -1.87* -0.0636 -0.87 
  MTR -0.0874 -1.21 -0.0215 -0.2 
PBR -0.0002 -0.25 -0.0001 -0.07 
  PBR 0.0041 3.01** 0.0024 1.24 
LOSS 0.0038 0.97 -0.0057 -1.33 
F-Value 2.89*** 5.99*** 
R2-Adj 0.0148 0.038 
N 1769 1770 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. Variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
Table 4 provides the regression results for sub-groups classified according to tax and financial reporting 
costs. In panel A of Table 4, tax costs are proxied by the firm’s marginal tax rate (MTR) in year t-2. We use the 
marginal tax rate in year t-2 to avoid the possibility that the marginal tax rate in t-1 may have been influenced by the 
firms’ tax planning prior to the tax rate reduction. The coefficient on YR for the high tax cost group is significantly 
positive, while the coefficient on YR for the low tax cost group is insignificantly positive. This difference shows that 
firms with high tax costs are more likely to shift taxable income through book-tax accrual management than firms 
with low tax costs, supporting hypothesis 2-1. 
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Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of the regression model (9) for sub-groups classified according to 
financial reporting costs, proxied by the firm’s debt ratio in year t-1. The coefficient on YR for the high financial 
reporting cost group is significantly negative, while the coefficient on YR for the low financial reporting cost group 
is insignificantly negative. This result suggests that the decrease in book-only accruals in the year of a tax rate 
reduction is pronounced for firms with high financial reporting costs because they are more likely to manage book-
only accruals in the year prior to the tax rate reduction than firms with low financial reporting costs, supporting 
hypothesis 2-2. 
 
Additional Analysis 
 
In Korea, a tax rate reduction is usually announced a year before it is implemented. Although depreciation 
and amortization are book-only accruals, it is difficult for firms to manage them for financial reporting purposes in 
the year preceding tax rate changes because their estimation cannot change every year. Furthermore, the effects of 
managing depreciation and amortization would be different from those of managing allowances, as the 
consequences of managed depreciation and amortization can last over many periods without being reversed in the 
subsequent period. 
 
Therefore, in extended analysis, we subdivide book-only accruals into two sub-components: allowance 
accounts, including allowance for bad debts and inventory valuation loss (DBOAallowance), and depreciation accounts, 
including depreciation and amortization (DBOAdepreciation). Then, we analyze how DBOAallowance and DBOAdeprecition 
change in the year of the tax reduction, respectively. Table 5 shows that the coefficient on YR is significantly 
negative only in the sub-component of allowance accounts. The untabulated descriptive statistics of sub-components 
show that the distribution of   DBOAallowance is similar to that of   DBOA, while   DBOAdeprecition is not. In addition, 
the standard deviation and range of   DBOAdeprecition is relatively smaller than those of   DBOAallowance or  DBOA. 
These results support our assumptions that firms are more likely to exploit allowance accounts than depreciation 
accounts in response to a tax rate reduction and that the decrease in book-only accruals stems mainly from the 
management of allowance accounts. 
 
Table 5 Regression Results for the Entire Firm Sample Using the Components of Book-only Accruals 
                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                       
Variables 
  DBOAallowance (A)   DBOAdepreciation (B) 
Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. 
Intercept 0.0244 1.84* 0.0024 1.46 
YR -0.0038 -1.93* -0.0001 -0.68 
SIZE -0.0000 -0.14 -0.0000 -1.16 
  SIZE 0.0065 1.73* -0.0004 -0.88 
LEV 0.0003 0.11 0.0003 0.69 
  LEV -0.0368 -4.1*** 0.0041 3.69*** 
ROA -0.0088 -0.79 0.0006 0.47 
  ROA 0.0291 3.14*** 0.0026 2.33** 
CFO 0.0158 1.46 -0.0007 -0.53 
  CFO -0.0202 -2.41** 0.0053 5.1*** 
MTR -0.0892 -2.31** -0.0042 -0.89 
  MTR -0.0451 -0.95 -0.0063 -1.07 
PBR 0.0000 0.03 0.0000 0.44 
  PBR 0.0035 3.95*** -0.0002 -2.5** 
LOSS -0.0005 -0.24 0.0000 0.27 
F-Value 5.97*** 5.26*** 
R2-Adj 0.0193 0.0166 
N 3539 3539 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. Variables are 
defined in Table 2. 
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This study follows Calegari’s (2000) method of decomposing discretionary accruals into book-tax accruals 
and book-only accruals. However, in Korea, allowances for bad debts or depreciation reported on financial 
statements are tax deductible as long as they are within the limit specified by the tax laws. These accounts within the 
tax limit are better suited for book-tax accruals than for book-only accruals because they do not create a book-tax 
difference. Therefore, for more precise analysis, we should have used tax return data to collect the non-tax 
deductible amounts of allowances and depreciation, and we should have classified non-tax deductible expenses as 
book-only accruals and the rest as book-tax accruals. 
 
We use a simple method because access to tax return data is limited. We estimate the tax limit amounts of 
allowance and depreciation by firms’ allowance rate (allowance for bad debts divided by receivables) and 
depreciation rate (depreciation expenses divided by depreciable asset). If a firm’s allowance rate is lower than the 
median of sample firms’ allowance rate, the firm’s allowance for bad debts is classified as book-tax accruals. If a 
firm’s allowance rate is higher than the median, the firm’s allowance for bad debts is classified as book-only 
accruals. The same procedure is applied to depreciation. We re-examine our hypotheses using the alternative 
measures of book-tax and book-only accruals, mitigating the possibility of accrual components misclassification. 
 
Table 6 Regression Results for Sample Firms Using an Alternative Measure for Book-tax and Book-only Accruals 
Panel A. Analysis of the Entire Firm Sample  
                                                                              
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                         
Variables 
  DBTA (A)   DBOA (B) 
Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. 
Intercept -0.1693 -3.10** 0.0338 2.09** 
YR 0.0323 3.97*** -0.0042 -1.74* 
Controls - - - - 
F-Value 31.43*** 4.53*** 
R2-Adj 0.1075 0.0138 
N 3539 3539 
Panel B. Analysis of Sample Firms Divided by MTR in Year t-2 
                                                                             
                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                               
Variables 
High Tax Cost Group (A) Low Tax Cost Group (B) 
Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. 
Intercept -0.0516 -0.76 -0.2708 -1.94* 
YR 0.0346 3.62*** 0.0244 1.11 
Controls - - - - 
F-Value 31.57*** 4.28*** 
R2-Adj 0.1246 0.0797 
N 3008 531 
Panel C. Analysis of Sample Firms Divided by LEV in Year t-1 
                                                                             
                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                
Variables 
High Financial Reporting Cost Group (A) Low Financial Reporting Cost Group (B) 
Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. 
Intercept 0.0311 1.35 0.0238 0.94 
YR -0.0057 -1.73* -0.0000 -0.01 
Controls - - - - 
F-Value 2.69*** 5.97*** 
R2-Adj 0.0150 0.0378 
N 1769 1770 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. Variables are 
defined in Table 2. 
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Panel A of Table 6 reports that YR is positively related to the change in book-tax accruals (  DBTA) and 
negatively related to the change in book-only accruals (  DBOA). Panels B and C of Table 5 show the results for 
sub-groups categorized based on the tax and financial reporting costs. The coefficient on YR is positively significant 
for the high tax cost group, while the coefficient on YR is not significant for the low tax cost group. Similarly, the 
coefficient on YR is negatively significant for the high financial reporting cost group, while the coefficient on YR is 
not significant for the low financial reporting cost group. We find that all results for the management of decomposed 
accrual components and their incentives are robust. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study explores the different roles of accrual components when firms face a reduction in the statutory 
corporate income tax rate. Korean firms encounter several tax rate reductions in 2000s and have opportunities to 
minimize their tax costs through taxable income shifting. The attributes of Korean tax environment, where book-tax 
conformity is high and aggressive tax shelters are restricted, provide the powerful ground for academics to 
investigate accruals for taxable income shifting. They also provide an ideal setting to examine how the firms resolve 
the book tax trade-offs caused by tax saving effort. 
 
The results of this study show that firms shift taxable income from the year preceding to the year of the 
reduction by managing book-tax accruals while concurrently mitigating book income fluctuation by managing book-
only accruals. Further, the extent of book-tax and book-only accruals management varies depending on the firms’ 
tax and financial reporting costs. This study sheds light on firms’ effective decision rule by identifying how they 
classify accruals in detail and minimize tax and financial reporting costs in response to a tax rate reduction. We 
believe that this study enables policymakers, auditors, financial information users, and academics to understand 
firms’ opportunistic accounting choices in response to government regulation changes. 
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